



**MODELS OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL  
COLLABORATION IN DEVELOPMENT**

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*Mark Leach is a Senior Consultant at IDR. He has coordinated the NGO Leadership Fellows Program, and consulted and done research on development partnerships, PVO strategy and restructuring, and financial sustainability. This research was supported by PLAN International and PLAN's Regional Office of South Asia. The author is grateful for the contributions of each and every person who shared their knowledge with us in PLAN, affiliated Indian NGOs, and other international development agencies.*

### **Introduction**

"Partnership" as a word has lost its ability to communicate anything specific due to indiscriminate use. It has been used to describe a broad range of relationships between development organizations, including international private voluntary organizations (IPVOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations (CBOs), multi-lateral and bilateral aid agencies, and private sector organizations.

Also, "partnership" has been used to describe inter-organizational arrangements which vary greatly on numerous dimensions, including:

- degree of mutuality in power and decision-making
- number of IPVOs and NGOs involved
- purpose and scope of the collaboration<sup>1</sup>
- roles and responsibilities of each organization
- formal and informal structures for interacting

We are concerned here with relations between IPVOs and NGOs. And since the word "partnership" no longer has any clear meaning, we prefer the term "IPVO-NGO collaboration", six models of which are presented later.

Further clarity about the nature of different kinds of IPVO-NGO collaboration is needed. This is because the number of such arrangements continues to grow, and because greater conceptual clarity may contribute to better matching of IPVOs with NGOs, better formal and informal agreements, and provide tools for improving existing collaborations.

Before looking more closely at different models of IPVO-NGO collaboration we will summarize the main forces resulting in the growth of these forms of development work.

### **WHY IPVO-NGO COLLABORATION?**

There has been a dramatic increase in the number of collaborations between Northern and Southern development organizations in the last ten years. Ron Jones, in his monograph "Choosing Partnership", describes the large scale forces underlying the move toward collaboration with NGOs this way:<sup>2</sup>

1. *Traditional Northern-dominated, "top-down" assistance has failed to provide sustainable improvements in the lives of the poor...*
2. *The interdependent nature of complex problems demands collaborative problem-solving approaches...and can be understood only with the benefit of insight from many vantage points...*
3. *The South's right and ability to control its own development is forcing northern PVOs to change their role...Recognizing the South's growing leadership capacity, the international donor community is beginning to look to Southern NGOs for program initiatives. By funding these programs directly, donors bypass Northern [IPVOs] in their traditional role of controlling intermediary.*

Although some donors are now bypassing IPVOs to directly fund NGOs, many donors are funding collaborations between Northern IPVOs and indigenous Southern NGOs.

There are other reasons for the increase in IPVO-NGO collaborations which are both practical and value-based.<sup>3</sup>

The major practical reasons are that IPVO-NGO collaborations:

- are more cost-effective than direct operations
- offer faster project start-up
- allow working in countries where direct operations are prohibited
- provide access to NGO skills and resources (such as innovative strategies sensitive to local conditions and culture, positive relations with the community, regional contacts with state agencies)
- allow IPVO to focus on other key tasks (such as regional networking, policy influence, documentation and dissemination of innovative strategies, or mass public education)
- may enhance each organizations's legitimacy with key stakeholders

Value-based reasons for the growth of IPVO-NGO collaborations (especially those most commonly referred to in development circles as "partnerships") include:

- increasing local control over the direction of development
- building local capacity and confidence through increased participation
- increasing sustainability by developing local independent structures
- strengthening "civil society" (i.e., balancing and/or supplementing government and market influences on development)
- increasing mutual learning (i.e., about culture and effective development strategies)

Different IPVO-NGO collaborations vary in their capacity to deliver the practical and normative benefits just described.

## **SIX MODELS OF COLLABORATION**

The framework presented below a) clarifies the range of IPVO-NGO collaborations which exist and b) distinguishes between six different models of IPVO-NGO relations which have too often been lumped together under the single label "partnerships".

As mentioned earlier, IPVO-NGO collaborations may be differentiated along many dimensions. One of the most useful ways is to differentiate them is on basis of the degree of *shared governance*. In other words, how much is decision-making authority—both formal and informal—shared between the organizations? Examining the degree of shared governance in different models of IPVO-NGO collaboration can help us understand many of the recurrent dilemmas and confusions found in these relationships.

The six models vary greatly in the degree influence which the collaborating IPVO(s) and NGO(s) have in determining strategy, goals, and systems and in the degree of operational involvement of the IPVO. These are idealized models, none of which exist in "pure" form. Most IPVO-NGO collaborations combine some elements of each.

The models are presented in order of increasing amount of shared governance. However, no value judgement is implied, as each model may have circumstances under which its use is most appropriate. The models are:

**#1 Contracting:** In which an IPVO pays an independent NGO to provide a well-defined package of services under conditions established largely by the IPVO.

**#2 Dependent Franchise:** In which a formally independent NGO functions as a field office of an IPVO which provides most or all of its direction and funding.

**#3 Spin-off NGO:** In which a Dependent Franchise or IPVO field office is expected over time to become organizationally and financially independent of the IPVO.

**#4 Visionary Patronage:** In which an IPVO and NGO with a shared a vision of development jointly agree on goals, outcome measures and reporting requirements for a program which the NGO implements and the IPVO supports with funds and other resources.

**#5 Collaborative Operations:** In which the IPVO and NGO share decision-making power over planning and implementation of joint programs implemented by the NGO with funding and technical support from the IPVO.

**#6 Mutual Governance:** In which the IPVO and the NGO each have decision-making power, or at least substantial influence, over each other's policies and practices at both the organizational and program levels.

### THE MODELS IN DETAIL

This section describes the six models of IPVO-NGO collaboration.<sup>4</sup>

#### Model #1 CONTRACTING

This is a simple fee-for-service exchange. The IPVO transfers funds to a fully autonomous NGO (or for profit service provider) which provides a specific package of services in return. The NGO is hired by the IPVO for a definite time period to implement a specific, well-defined project or program. Goals, strategies and systems (for financial accountability, administrative procedures and outcome measurement) are largely predetermined by the IPVO and are not negotiable by the NGO. There is no expectation by either party that the collaboration will extend beyond the term of the contract. No

specific expectation of institutional strengthening of the NGO exists.

Bilateral donors such as USAID frequently contract with NGOs to deliver discrete services or products, such as housing or tube-well construction, or immunization and health delivery services. Field offices of implementing IPVOs (i.e. those which not only fund but also design and implement development projects) also enter into these kinds of relationships with NGOs to provide services which are outside the expertise of the field office staff or which can be delivered more quickly or at lower cost by an NGO, such as disaster relief or pre-natal and infant health training for mothers.

The Contracting model offers several advantages to the IPVO. For IPVOs which are implementing organizations, the Contracting model is faster in many instances than the IPVO hiring or training its own staff to deliver the needed products or services. Speed is obviously an important advantage in disaster situations. It may be cheaper and more efficient as well, especially if the IPVO only expects to be in a region for a limited amount of time (as is true of some IPVOs currently operating in Eastern Europe), or where small size makes setting up an IPVO administrative unit uneconomical. The Contracting model may also have advantages when large scale and uniform quality is essential, for example in certain medical treatments and operations, or housing reconstruction in earthquake areas. The Contracting model may be more efficient when a particular skill is needed infrequently and across a wide geographical region—for example for certain kinds of studies or consultancies. Finally, the Contracting model may be useful when an IPVO is new to an area and has not developed the local knowledge or contacts to be able to perform satisfactorily on its own.

By minimizing IPVO presence in the field, this model can preserve NGO autonomy and identity more fully than any other model (providing that the NGO is sufficiently independent and the power differences between the NGO and the IPVO are not too great). It also offers the advantage of clean and clear lines of authority, and definite time and task boundaries which minimize the time spent managing interpersonal aspects of the relationship.

A potential disadvantage of the Contracting model (in the absence of implementor participation in program design) is that mis-specification of the problem or solution on the part of the IPVO may not be discovered until implementation is under way. More generally, there is less mutual learning that takes place in Contracting relationships. Each organization maintains or enhances its existing capacities, but is not likely to develop new ones.

Contracting models can exhibit great power imbalances between partners, depending on the financial health of the NGO and its degree of dependence on a particular contract. In rare instances where the NGO has a unique or critical competence, the IPVO is dependent on the NGO and the power relationship can be more balanced. Gross power imbalances can lead some NGOs to drastically alter their strategies and systems in order to satisfy IPVO requirements, leaving the NGO without a separate, useful identity at the end of the contract. Power imbalances can also distort communication, prevent grass roots feedback from reaching the IPVO, suppress necessary discussion of different points of view and result in inappropriate models of development being instituted without challenge. These limits on exchange of information are accentuated by the formal structure, roles, and essentially "top-down" nature of contractual relationships.

The Contracting model may be very useful in situations of disaster relief or for IPVOs involved in charity work. Its usefulness in building local capacity for sustained or replicable development is questionable, since most Contracting models are used to

deliver discrete services rather than to create or support local community structures.

Model #2 DEPENDENT FRANCHISE

The key feature of Dependent Franchise models is that the NGO has little organizational identity or autonomy apart from the IPVO which provides most or all of its funds. While formally a separate organization, the NGO functions as an IPVO field office. NGO program priorities, strategies and goals and financial and administrative systems and procedures are set in close accordance with IPVO requirements. The amount of NGO autonomy will vary depending, in part, on the degree to which programs and systems are mandated at a corporate or worldwide level by the IPVO.

In some cases the NGO is brought into being by the IPVO, and may or may not be registered as an indigenous organization. The NGO, at least initially, exists to implement the IPVO's program and is usually almost entirely dependent upon the founding IPVO for its funds. There are varying degrees of participation in decision-making by NGO staff and community members, but the range of decision-making authority is usually carefully circumscribed by the IPVO. NGO failure to stay within the guidelines of the IPVO's corporate strategy results in termination of funding and the demise of the NGO. Many Latin American NGOs started and funded by Christian churches in the North are of this sort.

Dependent Franchise NGOs are sometimes created unintentionally. This happens when an IPVO organizes a new NGO intending for it to become an independent organization—but then the independence doesn't evolve, usually because of over control by the IPVO or lack of management or fund-raising capacity on the part of the NGO. This has been the pattern in some partnerships formed by well-known North American child sponsorship organizations.

In other cases, the collaborating NGO already exists as an independent organization and is taken over by the IPVO. Typical "take-over targets" are NGOs which may be 1) relatively weak financially, managerially, or technically; 2) quite limited geographically; 3) have recently lost a principal source of funding; 4) are unclear about their own mission or strategy and thus easily influenced by a well-heeled donor. Such NGOs may be taken over by a previous IPVO "partner" or by a previously unaffiliated IPVO.

In franchise models the resource flows are more varied than in Contracting models, but the flows of influence are still largely from the IPVO to the NGO. In addition to funds, administrative and financial systems and program strategies, the IPVO may also provide technical and managerial training to NGO staff.

The principal advantage of a Dependent Franchise, from the perspective of some IPVOs, is the potential for widespread replicability of program approach. The IPVO benefits from public perception of the NGO as an indigenous organization, yet retains control over key aspects of program and administration. From the NGO perspective, the main advantages are in having a secure source of funding, and the prestige and increased influence which may accrue from being associated with a large international agency.

Some of the disadvantages are the same as in the contractor model. Specifically, power imbalances between the organizations are likely to be even greater, since the NGO is completely dependent upon the IPVO, and expected to remain so. This can lead to NGO suppression of negative feedback and to NGO reluctance to suggest innovative programs or methods which might be more locally appropriate but which may contradict those of the IPVO. Another major drawback of franchise models is that they may lack legitimacy in the eyes of host governments and indigenous people and organizations upon which

the programs might otherwise draw for resources, support and linkage. This questioning of legitimacy is likely to increase as more Southern development organizations and communities reject the idea of Southern development agendas being directed by Northern agencies.

#### Model #3 SPIN-OFF NGOs

Initially, a Spin-off model will closely resemble the Dependent Franchise model just described. The main difference is that from the outset, the expectation on the part of both parties is that the NGO will, over time, become organizationally and financially independent of the IPVO.

This has several important implications.

- The IPVO will usually need to provide support and training to the NGO to identify and capture additional sources of funding to replace IPVO resources as they are phased out.
- NGO leadership needs to have—or be capable of developing—the capacity to function without continued technical or managerial input from the IPVO.
- Legitimacy of the NGO's identity and strategy in the eyes of local stakeholders (community, government, funding agencies) must be carefully managed. The transition from franchise to independent operation may be difficult if the NGO's identity is overly determined by the strategies or reputation of the IPVO.

An advantage of the Spin-off model is that it combines widespread replication with the potential for greater innovation. It is also a means by which indigenous voluntary organizations may be created and strengthened in areas lacking them. Christian Children's Fund, for example, has spun-off many such NGOs in areas that were previously without vigorous voluntary sector activity.

There are several difficult dilemmas in this model. The kind of entrepreneurial leadership necessary for independent operations may not be the kind of leadership attracted to the start-up phase of this kind of collaboration. Second, some NGOs are reluctant to sever ties with the IPVO, fearing loss of prestige, funding and capacity building support. These factors make the transition to independence quite difficult. The legitimacy of some of these Spin-off NGOs may also be questioned if the IPVO does not have a good reputation in the region or has forced the NGO in its early years to adopt unpopular or inappropriate approaches to development.

In both the Dependent Franchise and Spin-off models, the IPVO is in a parental or developmental role in relation to the NGO. In the remaining three models, the IPVO establishes a relationship with more established, mature NGOs.

#### Model #4 VISIONARY PATRONAGE

In this model, an IPVO (or consortium of IPVOs) collaborates with an NGO (or consortium of NGOs) on the basis of a strong shared development goal or vision (such

as a shared commitment to eliminate child prostitution or to help the children of landless laborers by helping their parents acquire and cultivate land.) In this model, it is not necessary that the IPVO and NGO share a common strategy, or way of pursuing their common vision. The organizations agree on the goals for a specific project or a program of activities, and on some outcome measures and reporting requirements. It is then the NGO's role to design and implement a project or program to meet the goals and outcome targets. The IPVO provides money and/or other resources (such as technical support, fundraising expertise, opportunities to learn from others involved in similar work, training, etc.) which enable the NGO to do its work.

In many of these Visionary Patronage models the organizations have worked together in the past and each side has an expectation of some continued relationship. (This differentiates them from some traditional funders, such as Ford Foundation, where the expectation is that the relationship will not be ongoing.) This model is common among the funding agencies which have reputations for contributing to genuinely empowering, sustainable and innovative development work, including Oxfam UK, EZE (Germany) or, NOVIB (Netherlands) and Canada's South Asian Partnership.

Visionary Patronage models provide for the maintenance of organizational identity (as in the Contracting model), yet allows the NGO to bring its full range of skills and capacities to all aspects of program design and implementation. The IPVO has substantial say over the goals and outcome measures, and maintains close contact with NGO project staff through reports (typically twice yearly) and visits, ensuring that resources are being used as intended. The close contact also allows the IPVO to learn from the work of the NGO and to help disseminate learning across multiple projects. Due to clear differentiation of roles and tasks, the NGO maintains its identity and has substantial flexibility on strategy. These collaborations usually provide substantial latitude to the NGO in reporting formats, program strategy and financial management. For example, one German IPVO "suggests but does not require" use of their forms for fund transfers, progress reports, bookkeeping and audits. This IPVO also allows a variance of up to 30% on any budget line item, as long as the NGO stays within the overall agreed-upon budget. Another funder permits up to 10% overage on the total budget. These programs have the potential to mobilize local resources and participation, and to adapt more readily than other models to changing circumstances and unforeseen events.

A potential drawback of this model (depending on the perspective of the particular IPVO), is that the IPVO is removed from day-to-day implementation and operational decisions. This results in some loss of IPVO input and control. It also means that the IPVO might not gain as full an understanding of on-the-ground development realities as it might otherwise. This could limit the IPVO's ability to use its own staff to disseminate NGO innovations elsewhere. However several European IPVOs reportedly promote vigorous organizational learning through frequent exchanges among IPVO staff, IPVO Board members, NGO staff and among NGOs. There are relatively few disadvantages to NGOs of this model, unless, owing to large differences in power, or lack of NGO clarity on mission or strategy, the NGO distorts its systems, structure and culture in order to appear attractive to the IPVO.

### Model #5 COLLABORATIVE OPERATIONS

The essence of Collaborative Operations models is that the IPVO is actively engaged in project or program governance, along with the NGO, and the joint projects are

implemented by the NGO. That is, each partner has substantial influence and decision-making power regarding joint project design and implementation, and perhaps administration and evaluation as well.

In order to accomplish this, the IPVO and NGO must not only reach agreement on vision and goals, but also on strategy. This requires some sort of structure for joint decision-making on policy and implementation.

In some cases the IPVO and NGO establish one or several joint committees responsible for policy making, coordination and implementation oversight. Another structure suitable for large projects is for an IPVO to set up one of its own program staff at the NGO, and give that person authority to take joint program decisions on behalf of the IPVO. For example, both the Swiss government and the Canadian IPVO HOPE have full time representatives at MYRADA (a well-established NGO in Southern India) to institutionalize the partnership at the project level.

In Collaborative Operations models a fine line exists between joint decision-making and interference. This is a central dilemma in these models, and necessitates in some regions, as in South Asia, a high degree of personal comfort and trust between IPVO and NGO representatives. This is even more critical where there is a large imbalance in power or dependence between the partners. A strong expectation of ongoing joint work develops in successful Collaborative Operations due to the strength of the shared vision and the personal relationships which develop.

Collaborative Operations have many potential benefits including, for the IPVO: lower staff costs and overhead; increased effectiveness and decreased start-up time due to NGO linkage with other development actors and NGO knowledge of local conditions; a more legitimate and powerful basis from which to do advocacy; NGO credibility helps leverage government funds in the country of operation; opportunity for the IPVO to work in countries where direct operations are prohibited or restricted; increased understanding of on-the-ground realities.

NGOs involved in operational collaborations gain the potential advantage of: a relatively long-term source of funding; greater access to the IPVO's experience and knowledge with programs in other regions; learning new methods for management and administration; prestige that may come from close association with some IPVOs, which may permit them greater leverage in advocacy, fundraising, or access to existing infrastructure; increased understanding of pressures and realities of the donor organization.

Both sides of these collaborations may, over time, learn to increase their programmatic and administrative capacities. These models also contribute to increased South-North solidarity, a hard to quantify but increasingly important sort of affiliation to people seriously concerned with solving problems which cross international boundaries and which cannot be addressed by any single organization.

The many advantages of this model are matched by an equally large number of potential pitfalls for both NGOs and IPVOs. Since most Collaborative Operations are set up within or alongside existing NGO operations, measures must be taken to protect the pre-existing identity, culture, mission and strategy of the NGO. An NGO which is unclear about its mission, culture, or strategy or is overly dependent on the IPVO is at risk of losing its distinct identity. This could result in internal staff and morale problems at the NGO, and decreased legitimacy among the NGO's external constituents.

The IPVO potentially has more influence over program and financial issues than in the

Visionary Patronage model, but it has much less control than in direct operations or in a Contracting or Dependent Franchise arrangement. The rate of program growth is constrained by NGO management and field capacity.

In these models, the IPVO usually gets "less credit" for successful work, since the local NGO is the more visible partner. Collaborative Operations can also slow decision-making, depending on the nature of the joint decision-making structure and the amount of authority given by the IPVO to its representatives.

#### Model #6 MUTUAL GOVERNANCE MODELS

This sixth model is the furthest along the continuum of shared governance. In Mutual Governance arrangements each organization has either decision-making power or at least substantial influence over the policies and practices of the other organization. (Previous models only considered IPVO involvement in governance at the project or program level, and the "joint" decision-making did not encroach on any of the IPVOs "territory.")

The focus is on equalizing North-South power relationships, building strong international networks on an equitable basis, and maximizing programmatic and cultural learning on both sides. In these models, the quality of the ongoing relationship between the organizations and respect for the "South's right to control its own development" are valued as highly as the specific joint project or program.

There are many variations on this model, but several examples may clarify some essential features:

Katalysis, an American IPVO and four Latin American partner NGOs have evolved a Mutual Governance model with the following features:<sup>5</sup>

- Partners exchange seats on each others' Boards of Directors
- Directors and staffs of each organization are involved in each other's strategic planning
- Training and technical support is provided from IPVO to the NGOs, from NGOs to the IPVO and between the NGOs.
- Partners conduct joint fundraising efforts, frequently sharing both expenses and revenues.
- IPVO and NGO staff receive specific training in partnership skills
- Partners consult with each other on hiring of staff for key positions
- Partners jointly investigate and select new NGOs for partnership
- Each organization evaluates each other's organizational and programmatic performance

A large Canadian organization has also instituted some forms of Mutual Governance. This IPVO maintains Regional Advisory Committees in the areas where it works. Each year these committees send two representatives each to the IPVO's General Meeting where they, together with Canadian Regional representatives and IPVO Board members, develop and pass resolutions for final decision-making by the IPVO's Board. At the General Meeting, 40% of the votes are held by overseas Regional Representatives, 40% by Canadian Representatives and 20% by the IPVO Board of Directors. The IPVO also sponsors exchanges in which Canadian development workers visit overseas projects, and overseas workers visit Canada. Development workers from Third-world projects have been actively involved in designing strategies for Canadian development projects.

Another Canadian organization has three year rotating positions on its Board of Directors to be filled by members of Southern NGOs. Southern NGO staff are also involved in designing the IPVO's strategies for working in Canada.

Each partners' programs benefit from the intense two-way exchange of experience and knowledge, and from straightforward feedback which is distorted only minimally by differences in power and unequal dependence.<sup>6</sup> Katalysis reports also that this form of collaboration results in "profound changes in people's habits, attitudes and self-image by virtue of being listened to, respected and treated as equals. This kind of personal change results in the very goal of development: more productive and self-reliant people." (Jones, 1993, p.34)

One disadvantage is that the amount of interpersonal trust and relationship maintenance involved may make the Mutual Governance model somewhat self-limiting in size. This model also poses the maximum challenge to maintenance of organizational identity and satisfaction of stakeholders' interests. USAID evaluators agreed with Katalysis that "the long run costs of helping the poor [may] be lower in a Katalysis type network than in a traditional institutional arrangement...the programs of the Katalysis NGO partners were found to have significant positive impact on beneficiaries."<sup>7</sup>

### **EMERGING MODELS**

There are two additional types of IPVO-NGO collaborations about which there is currently very little information.

First, we have heard of, but have not investigated in any depth, a small number of collaborations similar to the Visionary Patronage model, but which do not have the expectation of an ongoing working relationship. These are organized more like research and development (R&D) teams, in which parties with complementary skills and resources come together only long enough to accomplish a common task and jointly generate a development project or program. These R&D arrangements seem relatively new and we have no information on what happens to the IPVOs, NGOs, or beneficiary communities when the collaboration ends.

Second, there is a model which differs from the others in that, to our knowledge, it is not yet in use. We offer the Joint Venture model here to further stimulate thinking about ways to address the multiple demands for accountability, mutuality and autonomy in IPVO-NGO relationships.

In a Joint Venture, the IPVO and an existing NGO jointly establish a new, independently registered NGO, with a board of directors half of which are IPVO representatives and half of which are NGO representatives. The joint venture would most likely involve an IPVO and NGO with a prior history of constructive collaboration.

For the NGO this arrangement has the advantage of equalizing power at the board level, insulates the NGO from the often destructive effects of implementing collaborative projects within existing NGO infrastructure, and makes accountability and liability more equally shared. Compared to Visionary Patronage models, this arrangement requires the NGO to share more operational decision-making authority with the IPVO. The presence of a foreign IPVO on the board of a nationally registered

"indigenous" NGO might give rise to questions about legitimacy and national sovereignty or self-determination.

While some IPVOs may see this as an unacceptable dilution of IPVO control and accountability, others may view it as a tangible way to respond to Southern NGO requests for more mutual power. It would also provide the IPVO with intimate knowledge of local realities affecting development in the region, potentially enhancing the IPVO's other operations in the area.

## **USES OF THIS FRAMEWORK**

One use of the models presented here is to restore some credibility to the concept of partnership by providing a more descriptive taxonomy of the different types of partnership. But there are some more practical uses as well.

First, the models may be used by IPVOs and NGOs in the process of selecting another organization with which to collaborate. The desired degree of shared governance, the nature of the development work to be done, and other advantages and disadvantages of the various models may be used as criteria for screening potential NGO or IPVO collaborators.

Second, the framework may be useful when establishing formal and informal agreements between collaborating NGOs and IPVOs. The models could provide a common vocabulary for discussion and negotiation of formal contracts or letters of agreement, and also for informal interaction. The advantages and disadvantages discussed under each model might be used as a checklist of needed safeguards each party may want to build into formal agreements, or as a basis for discussion of norms for working together which each party would like to see established informally.

Finally, the models may be used to improve the functioning of existing IPVO-NGO collaborations. An unexamined commitment to "partnership," in the absence of a close analysis of the degree of shared governance each party is truly willing to accept, promotes cooperation in the short-term, but dissatisfaction and less-than-optimal performance in the long-term. Comparing the espoused or stated model of partnership with the models which actually seem to be in use by each organization can uncover important contradictions and differences which, when resolved, may enhance effectiveness.

**ENDNOTES**

1. These six models presented here concern collaborations focussed on achieving specific development project or program goals. Partnerships with other purposes do exist. For example one class of IPVO-NGO relations, not discussed here, concerns partnerships whose primary purpose is to strengthen the NGO sector, or to build multi-sector alliances. While some of the models presented here support the institutional strengthening of the involved NGOs, this is not the principal purpose of the collaborations.
2. Jones, R.F. "Choosing Partnership: The Evolution of the Katalysis Model", published by Katalysis North/South Development Partnerships, Stockton, CA, April, 1993, pp. 7-8.
3. This distinction, and many of the reasons cited for growth in partnership, come from "Task Force Report on Working with Local Institutions," Action Aid, September 1993. The report offers very thoughtful and practical views on IPVO collaborations with indigenous institutions.
4. Examples of the models are given where possible. In cases where IDR has received permission to name an organization, or where the information is not likely to be sensitive or proprietary, organizations are named. Otherwise, examples are not given.
5. Jones, R. "Choosing Partnership: The Evolution of the Katalysis Model", a publication of Katalysis North/South Development Partnerships, Stockton, CA, April 1993, p.6.
6. Several methods have been used by Katalysis, Oxfam America, and progressive Canadian and European organizations to offset power imbalances inherent in the predominantly one-way flow of money between IPVOs and NGOs. These include: fostering the perspective that Northern funds are not "given away" , but traded in an equal exchange for Southern contributions of human and material resources; funders bypassing IPVOs to support NGOs directly; developing all partners' expertise in fundraising and grant reporting; joint fundraising campaigns with shared costs and revenues. (from Jones, 1993, p.6)
7. Katalysis/USAID Cooperative Agreement - End of Grant Evaluation, Dec. 18, 1992, pp. 3, 48 and 61.

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